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Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis

NOTES
FORCE-FEEDING HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONERS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS*
INTRODUCTION
1

The hunger strike has proven a potent tool to effect change. Mahatma
Gandhi fasted fourteen times between 1918 and his death in 1948 while leading
India's struggle for independence from Great Britain.2 In 1981, dissident
academician Andrei Sakharov and his wife fasted and won their daughter-inlaw's freedom from internment in the Soviet Union.3 Hunger strikes have also
been a means of protest in the United States. 4 Until 1982, however, no reported
United States decision purported to define a hunger striker's rights or the
countervailing state interests. 5 Last year, three state courts examined these
issues. 6 All three cases dealt with prison officials attempting to force-feed a
hunger-striking prisoner.7
*EnrroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the outstanding note of Fall Semester, 1982.
1. A hunger strike is defined as the action of a person who refuses to eat anything or
enough to sustain life in order to obtain compliance with his demands. WEuSrxR's Tnmu NEw
INTERNATIONAL DixriONAEY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1103 (1966). A person who
cannot eat for medical reasons is not on. a hunger strike. For the purposes of this Note, and
unless otherwise stated, a hunger striker is a person of sound mind and adult years. For a
summary of law dealing with the threshold issue of competency, see generally Sharpe &
Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients,36 FoRDHAm L. REv. 695, 696-97 (1968).
2. Hunger-Again a Tool for Protest, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 4, 1981, at 13. See
State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.EX2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982) (court recognized the efficacy of
Ghandi's hunger strike).
3. Russians' Way Out - Starve for Freedom, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 5, 1982, at 65.
In 1982, following Sakharov's example, eight Russians attempted starvation diets with mixed
results. Four quit their fasts winning nothing. The Soviets let one go, two others were promised
visas and one case was left undecided. Id.
4. See, e.g., In re Sessions, 672 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1982) (prisoners' hunger strike to
protest jail conditions); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(eleven inmate hunger strikers were removed from segregation and placed in hospital); United
States v. Bennet, 539 F.2d 45, 52 n.8 (10th Cir. 1976) (prisoner on hunger strike for 22 days).
See also Sinking a Name, TIME, May 10, 1982, at 17 (hunger strike successfully used to have
name of submarine changed); Hunger- Again a Tool for Protest, supra note 2 (report of
various uses of hunger strikes).
5. There were, however, unreported decisions which discussed these issues. See Boyce v.
Petrovsky, No. 81-3322-CV-S-WRC (W.D. Mo. Sept. 1981); In re Thomas Clauso, No. L33141-81
(Superior Ct. N.J., Mercer County Feb. 1982); White v. Borden Kircher, No. 81-C-422N (Cir.
Ct. W. Va., Marshall County Dec. 1981). Cited in Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66,
450 N.YS.2d 623, 626 (1982).
6. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E2d 715 (1982); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87
A.D.2d 66, 450 N.YS.2d 623 (1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
7. The term force-feeding requires definition. Only one inmate hunger strike case
mentions the medical procedures used to prevent death. That case authorized the state's use
of feeding by intravenous catheterization or by a nasal gastric tube. Von Holden v. Chapman,
87 S.D.2d at -_, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. This note uses the term to identify an undesired
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These recent cases do not satisfactorily resolve whether force-feeding prisoners is constitutionally permissible. Rather, the divergent decisions and rationale
of these cases disclose uncertainties prevalent in this newly litigated area. Only
one of these courts classified the hunger striker's behavior as suicidal.8 Another
court held in the prisoner's favor and found that the prisoner's privacy rights
overcame any state interest in preserving life. 9 The third court addressed the
same factors, but found the inmate status tipped the balance to the state. 10
Constitutional analysis of the bodily intrusions in force-feeding is peculiarly
absent from these opinions.
This note will develop an analytical framework for resolving prisoner
hunger strike controversies. To facilitate this development, the fact patterns
and modes of analysis in the three 1982 cases will be used. The note will then
explore each of the state interests pertinent to a prison hunger strike. The individual's constitutional rights in preventing a forced feeding will be examined
in juxtaposition to the state interests. Results from the interest/rights dichotomy
analysis will form a working framework for aiding future decisions.
'THE PRINCIPAL CASES

Zant v. Prevatte" was the earliest of the principal cases. A state official
petitioned the Georgia courts for permission to examine medically and, if necessary, to force-feed a fasting prisoner. 12 The inmate initiated his hunger strike
to attract attention to his transfer request. 13 The prisoner was mentally
competent 14 and had no dependents. 15 The state argued that its compelling
interests in protecting prisoners' safety and in preserving human life should
override the prisoner's privacy rights. 6 The Georgia Supreme Court found these
state interests insufficient to displace the prisoner's privacy rights.'7 These
artificial feeding such as those identified by the court above. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
8. Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
9. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 852, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
10. State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
11. 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982).
12. Id. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. At the time of the suit doctors predicted that the
prisoner would die within three weeks if the fast continued. Id. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 715.
13. Id. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The prisoner felt his life was in danger as long as he
remained in tile Georgia Prison System. The prisoner believed that there was an organized
plan to kill him which he called a "racial contract." He had requested a transfer to North
Carolina where he felt he would be safe. Id.
14. Id. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717. Implicit in the Georgia court's recognition of the
prisoner's sanity is a basic, yet vitally important, concept: a person who is otherwise mentally
competent should not be considered incompetent merely because he has undertaken a hunger
strike.
15. Id., 286 S.E.2d at 716. The importance of this factor is discussed infra notes 91-94 and
accompanying text.
16. 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716. The court found the state's interest in the prisoner's
life illogical since the prisoner had previously been under a death sentence. Id.
17. Id., 286 S.E.2d at 717. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on three cases
that dealt with patients who had become seriously ill yet were allowed to refuse life-saving
procedures. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973). The

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/5

2

Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis

1983]

FORCE-FEEDINGHUNGER-STRIKING PRISONERS

rights were held not to be relinquished merely because of inmate status, thus
a prisoner may competently choose to fast as a means of expression.'$
In State ex rel. White v. Narick, 9 a hunger-striking prisoner had lost over
one hundred pounds 20 in his protest of prison conditions. 21 The state asserted
its interests in the preservation of life as the basis for requesting permission
to force-feed. 22 West Virginia's highest court initially recognized that the fast
implicated the prisoner's protected rights of privacy and free expression. 23 Incarceration, however, severely modified these rights. The court concluded that
the state's interest in preserving life was superior to the prisoner's constitutional
rights.24
The third principal case was Von Holden v. Chapman.25 Mark Chapman,
imprisoned for killing John Lennon,2 declared he would starve himself to
death.2 7 His purpose was to publicize the plight of starving children.2 8 After
fasting for seven days Chapman was transferred to a psychiatric center because
examining physicians found him mentally ill based upon his desire to kill himself.2 9 A New York appellate court thus classified Chapman's behavior as
suicidal.2 0 The court found neither an inmate's rights of privacy nor free expression sufficient to overcome the state's interest in preventing suicide-' and
Zant court found the circumstances in these cases similar to those of a hunger striker. 248
Ga. at 832, 286 S.EX.2d at 717.
18. 248 Ga. at 832, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
19. 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982).
20. ld. at 55. The court stated that although the prisoner had lost in excess of 100 pounds
he had yet to suffer serious physical deterioration. Id.
21. Id. Shortly after the case was argued, the prisoner ended his fast. After working as the
prison's chief cook for four months, he gained back 50 pounds. Id. at 55 n.l.
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id.
24. Id. The court examined the same line of cases as did the Zant court, yet found them
unconvincing. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619
(1973). In its effort to distinguish refusal of medical treatment from a hunger strike, the
court cited J. JONES, FROM HERE To ETERNrrY (1951); D. Moums, THE NAKED APE: A
ZooLoGsT's STUDY OF THE HumAN ANIMAL (1967), and J. UPDIKE, RABBIT is RIc (1982). 292
S.E.2d at 58.
25. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
26. John Lennon was the famous musician who was once a member of the Beatles. The
murder made international headlines.
27. 87 A.D.2d at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. When prison officials sought a court order
authorizing force-feeding, Chapman had not eaten for 22 days. Although he was not in any
imminent danger of death, the court found judicial intervention necessary to prevent irreversible damage. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id. Chapman had frequently expressed a desire to commit suicide. The physician's
finding of mental illness was the basis of the transfer. Chapman, however, was considered
competent and was fully aware that his refusal to eat would result in death. Id.
30. Id. The court summarily reached this conclusion. No attempt was made to define
suicide and then apply the facts of the case to the definition.
31.

Id. at __.., 450 N.Y.S2d at 626-27. In regard to the privacy right, the court examined

treatment refusal cases similar to those examined in Zant and White. See supra notes 17 & 24.
The Chapman court focused on language in those cases recognizing a suicide prevention
interest above and beyond interests in preserving life. By classifying Chapman's behavior as
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affirmed an order authorizing Chapman's force-feeding.32
THE STATE'S INTERESTS

The principal cases 33 raised several justifications for force-feeding hungerstriking prisoners. They include the state's interest in suicide prevention, the
preservation of life, maintaining order and security in prisons, and the state's
obligation to protect the health and welfare of persons in its custody. Each of
these potential state interests will be examined below.
The State's Interest in Suicide Prevention
In Chapman, the court found the state's interest in suicide prevention
controlling3 4 The court, however, failed to explain why Chapman's behavior
was suicidal.3 5 Examining the definitions of suicide assists in justifying the
court's characterization. It also reveals why only the Chapman court used the
suicide-determinative approach when ruling on an inmate hunger strike.
The common law defined suicide as the intentional, 36 voluntary,3 7 and
positives" taking of one's own life. 39 Applying this definition requires two inquiries. First, did the individual intend to cause his own death? Second, did
the individual initiate the act leading to death?40 Both questions should be
41
answered affirmatively to find suicide.
Some courts relying on criminal law have interpreted the intent requiresuicidal, the court was able to distinguish seriously ill people who refuse treatment from the
hunger striker. Id. at
, 450 N.YS.2d at 626.
The court quickly disposed of Chapman's first amendment claims, finding that any free
speech rights available to a prisoner are limited by legitimate penal concerns. Suicide prevention, the court stated, is one such concern. Id. at _,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
32. Id.
33. The term "principal cases" is used here and throughout this note as a shorthand
reference to those cases outlined in the previous section: Zant, White, and Chapman.
34. 87 A.D.2d at
, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. See supra note 31.
35. 87 A.D.2d at
, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. See also supra note 30.
36. See Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 909 (WV.D.N.Y. 1947);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 370 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), rev'd, 380
S.W.2d 101 (1964).
37. See Fleetwood v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 Ala. 571, 575, 21 So. 2d 696, 700 (1945);
Muzenick v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, 154 Kan. 537, 541, 119 P.2d 504, 508

(1941).
38. See Edwards v. Traveler's Life Ins. Co., 20 F. 661 (N.D.N.Y. 1884), af'd, 122 U.S. 457
(1887); Parker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 389 Mo. 42, 62, 232 S.W. 708, 713-14 (1921).
39. See Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins., 93 U.S. 284, 287 (1876); Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. v. Groom, 86 Pa. 92, 97 (1878).
40. See Note, Suicide and the Compulsion of Lifesaving Medical Procedures: An Analysis
of the Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 285, 295-96 (1978). The traditional
definition of suicide was based on the act's criminality. See infra note 55 and accompanying
text. These inquiries focus on the two basic elements of any crime. The first question looks
for intent, the mens rea. The second is searching for a criminal act, the actus reus. See
generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 175-76 (1972).
41. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977). See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent
Adult, 44 FonAms L. Ruv. 1, 17-18 (1975).
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ment as an objective test.42 Individuals "intend" the natural and probable
consequences of their acts 4 3 A voluntary hunger strike would meet this objective test, since the natural and probable consequence of not eating is death. 44
The intent requirement has also been interpreted as a subjective test that
focuses on what the actor has an actual desire to do, rather than on the consequence of his actions.4 5 Some courts dealing with blood transfusions to Jehovah's
Witnesses have adopted this approach. 46 Jehovah's Witnesses believe blood
transfusions are religiously forbidden even when necessary to save one's life.47
An objective intent test for suicide would be met when the probable consequence of refusing the blood is death. To avoid this result, courts have applied
a subjective test that instead focused on the patient's conscious objective.48
The necessary intent was lacking because the patient's wish was not to die
but only to follow his religious precepts. 4 9 Under a subjective intent standard,
the hunger-striking prisoners in the principal cases may not be suicidal. In
Chapman, the prisoner declared that he would starve himself to death for his
cause. 0 Chapman's conscious objective was a starvation-caused death thereby
meeting even the subjective intent test. In the other two cases, however, the
conscious goal was to obtain favorable treatment from the prison.5 ' In each,
the prisoner intended to amplify his request through the slow deterioration of
his body, 2 but there was no desire to die should prison officials meet his demands. 3 The subjective intent test would not be met in those cases. The sub42. See, e.g., Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 909 (W.D.N.Y.
1947); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 279, 281-82, 229 A.2d 670, 672-73
(1971).
43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
44. Using the objective test, religious or ideological motivation has no effect on the
finding of the necessary intent. Id. See Eicher v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 31,451, 426 N.Y.S2d 517, 533
(1980) (discussing homicide and involuntary euthanasia), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
45. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977) (citing Byrn, supra note 41, at 17-18); Cantor, A Patient'sDecision
to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,
26 Rutmrms L. REv. 228, 255 (1973).
46. See In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
47. This belief is based on passages from the Bible, Leviticus 3:17. See generally Ford,
Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAw. 212 (1964).
48. 331 F.2d at 1009, 294 A.2d at 374.
49. In Georgetown College, the court stated: "The Gordian knot of this suicide question
may be cut by the simple fact that Mrs. Jones did not want to die.... Death to Mrs. Jones,
was not a religiously-commanded goal, but an unwanted side effect of a religious scruple." Id.
50. 87 A.D.2d at _
450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
51. In Zant the prisoner wanted a transfer to another state's prison system. 248 Ga. at
833, 286 S.EX2d at 716. The White court alluded to a protest about prison conditions. 292
S.E.2d at 55.
52. Although this was not explicitly stated in these cases it is mentioned as one of the
essential components of a successful hunger strike. See The Irish Hunger Strike, 110 TiE
NATION 540 (1920).
53. See Dooley-Clarke, 11 Medical Ethics and PoliticalProtest, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5
(1981). "Death by starvation is not the stated objective of the hunger strike, but it is a necessary component." Id. at 6.
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jective intent standard is one explanation why Chapman is the only principal
case to find the hunger striker suicidal.
A court may validly apply the subjective intent test when evaluating the
suicidal aspects of a hunger strike. The objective test is a product of the criminal
5
law, 4 but American jurisdictions have rarely accepted the English policy 5
of providing criminal sanctions against suicides. 5 6 Nevertheless, American
courts have adopted the criminal law intent test in at least one area of civil
suicide litigation, life insurance.57 Courts often find the the presumption of
suicide implicit in the objective test necessary to protect insurance carriers, because once an insured has died there may not be any indication of his true
intent. 58 This rationale does not obtain in a hunger strike, as the faster is alive
and communicates his motivations throughout the strike.5 9 The courts need
not resort to the criminal law's objective test in civil litigation when the subjective intent is available.6°
The second part of the traditional suicide test is met by finding a voluntary,
positive act of self-murder.6 1 Is a hunger strike such a positive act? A hunger
striker might assert that his fast is an omission rather than a commission of an
54. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
55. Under English common law, suicide and attempted suicides were clearly crimes. See
Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 222, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903). "By the English common law
suicide was a felony, and the punishment for him who committed it was internment in the
highway with a stake driven through the body, and the forfeiture of his lands, goods, and
chattels to the king." See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 189-90 (suicide in England
once ranked among the highest crimes). Suicide is no longer a crime in Great Britain. See
Suicide Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, § 1, reprinted in PUBLIC GENERAL Acrs AND MEASURES
OF 1961, 766 (neither suicide nor complicity therein shall be considered a crime); Zellick,
The Forcible Feeding of Prisoners:An Examination of the Legality of Enforced Therapy, 1976
PUB. LAW. 153, 162.

56. Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 222, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903). See also Commonwealth
v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162, 162-63 (1870) (although prohibited by law, attempted suicide is
unpunishable); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 476, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1961) (attempted suicide
is criminal but unpunishable). But see Allen v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080, 1083
(1925) (one giving poison to person planning suicide, knowing the suicide's intent, is guilty
of murder). Also noteworthy is the Model Penal Code's view: "While attempted suicide is
still viewed as [criminal] in a few states, we think it clear that this is not an area in which
the penal law can be effective and that its intrusion on such tragedies is an abuse." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 201.5 comment I (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), quoted in Comment, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. Rav. 463, 471 (1969).
57. See, e.g., McReynolds v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 700 (1942); Lincoln Petroleum Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 115 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir. 1940); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hollowell, 14 Ind. App. 611, 43 N.E. 277 (1896);
Werber v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. App. 624 (1926).
58. See Note, supra note 40, at 307.
59. The hunger strike is an optimal for proving the true intent. Death from fasting is
never quick, allowing time for the striker to be questioned and his motives analyzed. As seen
in Chapman, a psychiatrist can testify as to his perception of the faster's true intent. See
supra text accompanying note 29. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (judge went
to hospital to speak with a dying Jehovah's Witness to discern his motivations for refusing
blood).
60. See Note, supra note 40, at 307-08 (author makes the same argument regarding treatment refusal cases).
61. See supra cases cited in notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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act. 62 Judicial dicta and legal commentators, however, have observed that refusing food differs from an omission in the ordinary sense. 63 Eating is so normal
and necessary that its cessation becomes an act in the usual sense of that term's
usage. The volitional act inquiry, therefore, should be met in any hunger
strike situation. Thus, the interpretation and application of the intent test
determines whether a particular hunger strike meets the traditional suicide
definition.6'
The State's Interest in Preservationof Life
The state's police power encompasses the means to protect the health and
safety of its citizens. 65 When a self-endangering activity also threatens the wellbeing of others, the state may interrupt that activity.66 In the hunger strike cases,

62. A few courts and commentators have found distinctions between omissions and commissions irrelevant when discussing suicide prevention. See In re President of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CAL. L. REV. 860 (1965). This

position has been highly criticized. See Byrn, supra note 41, at 18; Riga, Compulsory Medical
Treatment of Adults, 22 CATH. LAW. 105, 133 (1976).

63. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (referring to case of Regina v.
Wagstaff, 10 Cox Crim. Cases 530 (1868)); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58
N.J. 576, 581-82, 279 A.2d 670, 672-73 (1971); Byrn, supra note 41, at 18. See also Zellick, supra
note 55, at 165 n.55.
64. The Zant court never used the term suicide in its opinion. The White court only
mentioned the prevention of suicide interest in a footnote. "Prevention of suicide is a tenet of
our society, but inroads are being made upon it by terminally ill patients who refuse medical
treatment." 292 S.E.2d at 58 n.3. The refusal of the courts to discuss suicide is perhaps explained by the fact that hunger strikes are observably different from the usual suicide which
involves an impulsive manifestation of mental disorder. See Bergler, Suicide: Psychoanalytic
and Medicolegal Aspects, 8 LA. L. Rav. 504 (1948); Dooley-Clarke, supra note 53, at 5; Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 227, 233

(1974).
The state's suicide prevention interest is paternalistic. The competent and rational hunger
strikers in Zant and White had no need for this paternalism. See Dooley-Clarke, supra note
53. The author reports a psychiatrist's view that nothing is achieved by equating hunger
strikes with attempted suicides. The latter is a result of mental disturbance. The hunger
striker, however, uses death as a part of a pre-conceived strategy. Id. at 5. Some courts and
commentators proclaim the traditional definition of suicide obsolete or inapplicable. See
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 n.11 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 52, 355 A.2d 647, 670, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); Riga, supra note 62, at 134-35; Note, supra note 40, at 312. See infra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
65. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (police power permits reasonable regulation for public safety); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,
371 (1976) (state retains "broad power" to protect public health).
66. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy
of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government . . .
to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in every wellordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the
rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times . . . be subjected to
such restraint ...as the safety of the general public may demand.
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as well as in other contexts, 67 the state has asserted an interest in preserving
life even with activities which imperil only the actor. 68 This preservation of life
interest is rooted in various bases: the fourteenth amendment, general notions
9
of public good, and the parenspatriaedoctrine.6
The fourteenth amendment's guarantee to protect lifeo0 is arguably a mandate for the state to use necessary means to preserve citizens' lives. 71 Because
other constitutional protections may be intelligently waived,7 2 a competent
hunger striker apparently may waive the protection of his own life.73
Notions of general public good often underlie the state's preservation of life
claims but are rarely discussed by courts. 7 4 The interest in public good is im-

plicit in some judicial reaction to motorcycle-helmet law challenges. Most
courts faced with these suits have found the state's right to prevent purely selfendangering activity irrelevant or insufficient7 At least three courts, however,
Id. at 29. See also Bogue v. Faircloth, 316 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (motorcycle helmet
laws constitutional because of possible danger to others on the road).
67. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (state
trying to prevent access to Laetrile), remanded on other grounds, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980); State v. Eitel,
227 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1969) (motorcycle helmets must be worn to preserve life of cyclist);
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (religious group forbidden to handle
snakes and drink strychnine), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
68. Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 833, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1982); Von Holden v. Chapman,
87 A.D.2d 66, - 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58
(W. Va. 1982).
69. The principal cases do little to identify these bases. The most explicit statement by
any of the three courts was: "A state must preserve human life, a concern at the very core of
civilization." 292 S.E.2d at 58 (citation omitted).
70. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life . . .without due process of law .. "
71. See Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered- The Choice of Death As an Aspect of the
Right of Privacy, 17 Aiuz. L. REv. 474, 482 (1975). Delgado theorizes that if the Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had found "personhood" in the fetus then abortion could
be prohibited. An individual attempting to die could likewise be prohibited from extinguishment. Delgado, supra, at 482-83.
72. The fourteenth amendment protects against deprivation of property. It cannot -be
questioned, however, that a person may waive this protection and give his property away.
See Delgado, supra note 78, at 483.
73. A court, however, may substitute its judgment for that of an incompetent person
in determining the disposition of his property. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Chambers, 204 Ark. 81, 160 S.W.2d 888 (1942). If a hunger striker is found incompetent, the
court may then exercise its best judgment and protect his life.
74. This basis in essence applies a paternalistic social model to our current form of
government. Under this model, it is the government's duty to play a positive role ensuring
the security and welfare of the people as a whole. This interest in the whole of society
legitimizes the use state's use of police power to prohibit people from engaging in activities

hazardous only to themselves. See generally T.

HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND

POLITIC (2d ed. 1969).
75. Some courts have held the laws unconstitutional as being beyond the scope of the
the police power. See, e.g., People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968), overruled, City of
Adrian v. Poucher, 67 Mich. App. 133, 240 N.W.2d 298 (1976); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc.
175, 252 N.E.2d 866 (1969). Most courts, however, have upheld such statutes as protecting other
drivers from an injured motorcyclist. See, e.g., Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285,
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have recognized the government's public interest allowing it to protect an individual from himself.7 6 Implicitly, these courts reasoned that the government
has a duty to ensure a productive and vital society. All persons form the
societal whole, therefore, the viability of each individual is a matter of
governmental concern.7 7 .

Whether this public interest sufficiently supports state action to save a
hunger-striking prisoner's life is questionable.7S General notions of societal
79
benefit are a rather incorporeal foundation for the preservation of life interest.
This interest, like the suicide prevention interest is supported only by varying
and subjective social and religious norms.A0 Indeed, the increasing number of
cases where death has been competently chosen may manifest change in these
underlying norms.8 ' Furthermore, the courts' reasoning seems exceedingly
narrow. It is a mistake to assume that the communal whole is always best
217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed, 395 US. 212 (1969); Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass.
769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968); State v. Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345,
252 A.2d 223 (per curiam), cert. denied, 54 N.J. 257, 254 A.2d 800 (1969).
76. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 490-91 (Fla. 1969) (state may preserve life of individual
"for his own sake," for some "divinely ordained and humanely explicable purpose"); State v.
Lee, 51 Hawaii 516, 518, 465 P.2d 573, 576 (1970) (state has valid interest in preventing threat
to "the very fabric of society'); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 51, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382
(dictum) (upheld statute on other grounds, but might have upheld it even if its only aim were
to "protect persons against the consequences of their own actions'), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S.
709 (1969).
77. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 US. 366, 397 (1898);, Delgado, supra note 71, at 491;
Comment, State ex rel. Swann v. Pack: Self Endangerment and the First Amendment, 65 Ky.
L.J. 195, 203 (1976).
78. Although the preservation of life interest is mentioned in White and Chapman, these
courts did not rely on that factor. The Chapman court based its holding on the suicide prevention interest. 87 A.D.2d at -, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 626. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text. The White court's conclusion was that the preservation of life interest outweighs an inmate's rights. 292 S.EZ2d at 58. The court then went on to state: "We cannot condemn fasting
- Ghandi taught us about its force - as a way to secure change." Id. This observation, coupled
with a statement concerning prisoners' use of hunger strikes to manipulate the system, id.,
leads to the conclusion that the court has relied on prison concerns to allow force-feeding, not
on the general notion of life preservation.
79. This is evidenced by the court's failure to discuss this basis, despite numerous citations
to the preservation of life interest. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1971).
80. The religious norms are based in the concept of sanctity of life. The Biblical source
is the commandment, "thou shalt not kill." Exodus 20:13. See Byrn, supra note 41, at 21. One
author has commented that free-willed death goes against the sanctity of life because any
unnecessary death cheapens it. Note, supra note 62, at 867. But see Cantor, supra note 45, at
244 (assertion that the sanctity of life is dependent on the ability to exercise free will).
Social norms can be traced to the English idea that a death deprived the King of loyal
subjects. See Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (C.B. 1562). An American adaptation of
this notion was stated by Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he care of human life and happiness, and
not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government." 16
WarriNGs oF THOMAS JErFRSON 310 (Lipscomb & Bergh 1903), quoted in Byrn, supra note
41, at 21. But see supra note 64.
81. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Quackenbush, 156 NJ.
Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
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served through the forced preservation of every individual's life. For example,
the hunger strikes in Zant and White might appear self-serving. If these strikes
were instead viewed as bringing to light prison practices of such insidiousness
that they provoked a life-endangering protest, 2 it is then conceivable that the
gains from effective hunger-striking could contribute more to society than
3
would a single individual's continued existence.
One other basis upon which the state may rely to support its preservation
of life interest is its parens patriaerole. s4 Under the parens patriae doctrine the
state must intervene when necessary to protect individuals who cannot protect themselves85 The state has used this doctrine to prevent self-initiated
death by mental incompetents 86 and children. 87 A few courts have equated
prisoners with children and the insane so that medical treatment can be dispensed despite the prisoner's withholding consent."s At least one federal court
has found, however, that the lack of prisoner consent to a medical procedure
could be sufficient basis for an action against the prison.8 9 This decision properly
82. This presupposes that the hunger strike attracts the attention of prison officials or
governmental bodies who have the ability and desire to change any inhumane treatment of
prisoners. For a description of the elements necessary for a politically successful hunger
strike, see The Irish Hunger Strike, supra note 52. See also Hunger - Again a Tool for Protest,
supra note 2 (recounting how inmates in Attica, N.Y., received better prison conditions as a
result of the hunger strike).
83. The end of racial discrimination would certainly benefit society to a great extent. In
1963, 15 white anti-segregationists in a North Carolina jail fasted for prison reforms. Their
demands were met. Hunger- Again a Tool for Protest, supra note 2. No one in that strike
died. Id. If, however, the willing death of one of the strikers were necessary for their demands to be met, would it not still be possible to say that society realized a net gain?
84. Parens patriae literally means parent of the country. The doctrine refers to the
state's right, as sovereign, to act as guardian of legally disabled persons. State of W. Va. v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
85. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 575 (1975); Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent
Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285, 309 (1976).
86. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Schiller,
148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (1977); State Dep't of Human Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W2d
197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). Most courts, however, that have found a patient competent to
refuse life-saving treatment, reject state parens patriae assertions when incompetency sets in
during the waning moments of life. See Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130
(N.D. Ill. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 365-66, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
87. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
See also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (pregnant woman may not refuse necessary blood transfusion).
88. See Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (dictum). "Even though
the treatment is unusually painful, or causes unusual mental suffering, it may be administered
to a prisoner without his consent if it is recognized as appropriate by recognized medical
authority or authorities." Id. at 605. "[I]t is well established that medical care which is administered over the objections of a prisoner does not constitute the denial of any federal
right." Smith v. Baker, 326 F. Supp. 787, 788 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (dictum), aff'd, 442 F.2d 928
(8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirmed dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction).
89. Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974). The court found that although
the other state interests of prison security and life preservation could possibly overrule the
patient's choice, the state's judgment of what was best for the prisoner could not be sub-
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recognizes that incarceration does not remove a person's ability to fully under90
stand the consequences of his actions and to make rational choices accordingly
Some courts have cited parens patriae as a basis for preventing a parent's
death when it would mean abandoning a dependent child. 91 The' state's
interests are to protect a child from psychological harm due to the loss of a
92
parent and to prevent the child from becoming a public charge. Most courts
have not allowed this parenspatriaeclaim if the one seeking death could show
these harms will not occur in that particular instance. 93 An inmate hunger
striker should be afforded the same opportunity. 4
The State's Obligation to Protect the
Health of Persons in Its Custody
Prison officials are under a common law duty to provide medical treat96
ment to inmates. 95 This duty was found determinative in Leigh v. Gladstone,
a 1909 English decision allowing force-feeding of a fasting prisoner. Mrs.
97
Leigh was serving a short sentence for illegal suffragette activities. After
!Z_

stituted for the prisoner's own decision. Id. at 735. See also Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1,
159 S.EZ2d 719 (1967) (valid cause of action against prison medical director for capriciously
X-raying inmates without their consent).
90. See J. GOBERT & N., COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 338 (1981); Zellick, supra note 55, at
173.
91. See In re President of Georgetown College, 381 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976) (parens
patriae not mentioned by name but the legal concerns supporting doctrine are alluded to
throughout).
92. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 378 Mass. 728, 742, 870
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). But see Cantor, supra note 45, at 251-52. The emotional abandonment
argument, though appealing, is not necessarily implicated by the parent's death. The state's
argument presupposes a loving, supportive relationship. This assumption should be tested
in each circumstance, especially in light of the effect incarceration has on such relationships.
Id. One student work has suggested that a parent's willingness to die for his beliefs can be a
source of pride and respect for the child. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's
Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REv. 293, 301 (1966).

98. See In re Osborne, 294 A2d 372 (D.C. 1972). The court refused to order a transfusion
for a 834-year-old man whose wife agreed with his decision and "who had, through material
provision and family and spiritual bonds, provided for the future well-being of his two
children." Id. at 375. In Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the
court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint that alleged constitutional violations from the
administration of a blood transfusion under color of law. The patient had a wife and a young
child, but the court was lacking information on whether the family's sole support came from
the patient. Id. at 130.
94. The Zant court apparently recognized this parens patriae interest when it made
special note of the fact that the fasting prisoner had no dependents. 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E2d
at 717.
95. See, e.g., Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291 (1926) (public required to
care for prisoners, who, because of the deprivation of their liberty, cannot care for themselves). There is usually also a statutory duty to care for prisoners. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
US. 97, 103 & n.8 (1976). Lack of medical attention can also violate the eighth amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
96. 26 T.L.R. 139 (1909).
97. Id. at 140. She had previously been convicted of resisting arrest at least five times.
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refusing food for three days she was forcibly fed, occasioning extreme pain and
discomfort.9 8 She claimed the force-feeding was a means of prison discipline to
deal with a stubborn prisoner.19 In a conclusory opinion, the court ruled that
as a matter of law the prison official's duty to maintain the prisoner's health
mandated life-preserving action. 00 The prisoner's requests to be let alone were
irrelevant because allowing the prisoner to die would be a breach of duty.,-,
Similar reasoning was cited by the court in Chapman.02
The Leigh court's rationale is superficially appealing, but it confuses two
distinct tort concepts. The first deals with the scope of a person's duty of care, 10 3
and the second focuses on the substantive nature of that duty. Generally, a
person has no legal duty to assist another whose life is in danger. 0 4 A duty
arises, however, when one is charged with the responsibility of caring for that
person, 10 5 as are prison officials.' 0 6 The state has a duty to protect a prisoner
from harm. 0 7 If prison authorities know or have reason to believe a prisoner
might commit suicide, those authorities must use reasonable care to prevent
it.108

She was placed in jail for climbing up on a roof and throwing stones and bottles through the
windows of a meeting hall. When the police came for her she threw slates and gravel at
them. When placed in jail she broke the cell's windows with her fists. Id. at 141.
98. Id. at 140. She was fed through a flexible tube inserted through her nose or mouth. Id.
99. Id. at 140. Except for the force-feeding, however, she was treated well. Id. at 141.
100. Id. at 142. There was no appearance of any legal authority for the court's conclusion. The opinion contained no discussion of relevant principles of law, nor was there
citation to any cases or statutes. Id. See Zellick, supra note 55, at 160.
101. 26 T.L.R. at 142. There was no debate about whether force-feeding was legal per se,
the only question before the jury was whether the feeding was properly done.
102. 87 A.D.2d at _,
450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The court stated that Chapman's conduct was
not constitutionally protected. Rather, the state has a duty to protect the health and welfare
of persons in its custody. Id. See also Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Kan. 1978)
(court used exactly the same arguments as did the Leigh court).
103. The scope of the duty is essentially a proximate cause test. If one is not under a
duty to protect against a harm, he cannot proximately cause that harm and cannot be held
liable. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 244 (4th ed. 1971).
104. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 131 S.E.2d 905 (1966) (no duty to
save drowning child); Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955) (no duty to prevent
neighbor's child from hammering on a dangerous explosive). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 103, at 340-41.
105. See Cashen v. Riney, 239 Ky. 779, 40 S.W.2d 339 (1931) (school owes duty of care
to pupils); Sylvester v. Northwesiern Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17
(1952) (hospital owes duty of care to patients). See generally Harper & Kime, The Duty to
Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 898 (1934).
106. Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Taylor v. Slaughter, 171
Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 P. 1023 (1918).
107. Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969); Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167,
138 S.W.2d 350 (1940); Wilson v. State, 36 A.D.2d 559, 317 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1971). Of course, a
duty to keep prisoners safe from harm does not mean that the state will be liable for every
injury to its prisoners. Usually, the state is liable only for foreseeable risks of injury. Id. at
559-60, 317 N.Y.S.2d 548. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1976) (establishes the duty of care to
prisoners in federal penitentiaries).
108. See Maricopa County v. Cowart, 106 Ariz. 69, 471 P.2d 265 (1970); Thomas v.
Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962); Dezort v. Hinsdale, 35 Ill. App. 3d 703,
342 N.E.2d 468 (1976).
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The second concept involves substantive tort elements. Any force applied
to a person without privilege or consent is tortious. 109 Such force is tortious
even if it results in trivial harm 10 or a benefit.' 1 For medical treatment to be
nontortious there must be either consent, whether express or implied,"12 or a
privilege."" There is no basis for the Leigh court's reasoning that the state's
extended duty of care changes the substantive nature of that duty." 4
Legal commentators have stated that the Leigh decision reflects the then applicable suicide felony laws." 5 The Chapman court invoked the Leigh rationale
because it found Chapman's strike suicidal. 6 If the Leigh court's rationale
had been that the state's custodial role mandated state action to prevent suicide,
then there would have been no misperceptions of tort law. The common law
power to prevent suicide 17 would be transformed into a duty which would
make the touching nontortious. This duty is the law presently recognized by
most United States jurisdictions."18 Under this analysis, courts deciding prison
hunger-strike cases should deem suicide prevention an adjunct of the state's
109. See W. PROSSER, supra note 103, at 36. The essence of a battery action is not the defendant's intent, but the unprivileged or unconsented touching of the plaintiff.
110. See Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954); Bumgart v. Bailey, 247
Miss. 604, 156 So. 2d 823 (1963); Rullis v. Jacobi, 79 NJ. Super. 525, 192 A.2d 186 (1963).
111. See Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1957); Schoendorif v.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds,
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N-E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 10 (1957).
112. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
113. A privilege can arise through a court order. In re President of Georgetown College,
331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). A privilege is also found in an
emergency situation where there is not time to gain consent. Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122,
136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 925, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931).
114. See Kennedy, The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to
Receive Further Treatment from Doctors, 1976 CRius. L. REv. 217, 227; Editorial, Feeding

Prisoners by Force, 1974 Cum. L. Rrv. 206, 206-07. (Both articles criticize the Leigh court's
rationale.) An example will illustrate how the Leigh court incorrectly applied these two tort
law'concepts. A stranger noticing a burning house owes no duty of care to the house's owner
and need not act. See supra sources cited in note 104. If a fire department sees the fire, however, a duty arises since it is charged with the prevention of fire damage to property within
its jurisdiction. See City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 76, 208 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1949). A
fire department would therefore have to use reasonable means to save the house. See supra
sources cited in notes 105-06. Nevertheless, as long as no other property or life is endangered,
neither the stranger nor the fire department has the right to save the property if the owner
wishes it to burn. See W. PROSSER, supra note 103, at 124-25.
115. See Zellick, supra note 55, at 163, 169. "Apart, then, from the fact that suicide was a
crime, there is little in the common law generally to support [the Leigh] ruling." Id. at 169.
See also Kennedy, supra note 114 (the Leigh opinion was merely a response to the times).
116. 87 A.DJ2d at __, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
117. This common law power was originally based on the legal concept that one can use
reasonable force to prevent the commission of a crime. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,
supra note 40, at 406. See also Byrn, supra note 41, at 18. Byrn discusses the effect of privilege
to prevent suicide. Often, this privilege has been made statutory. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE
§ 35.10(4) (McKinney 1975).
118. See, e.g., Porter v. County of Cook, 42 I1. App. 3d 287, 355 N.E2d 561 (1976)
(prisoner hearing "voices" set fire to mattress, injuring himself); Thorton v. City of Flint, 89
Mich. App. 260, 197 N.W.2d 485 (1972) (prisoner hearing "voices" jumped from upper bunk);
Gioa v. State, 22 A.D.2d 181, 254 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1964) (jail liable for foreseeable suicide of
prisoner).
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custodial care interest. This emphasizes the importance of finding suicide
under the analysis previously discussed.
The State's Interest in Maintaining
Security and Order in Prison
A prison administration's primary task is to maintain security and order." 9
The White court partially relied on this state interest and allowed forcefeeding."20 Implicit in White is that the hunger striker can be force-fed because of his inmate status. 2 1 Although the court did not directly base its holding on security and order considerations,22 it cited Commissioner of Correction
v. Myers,"3 which did.1 24 In Myers, a prisoner refused life-saving hemodialysis

treatments to protest his placement in a medium, as opposed to minimum, security prison. 12 ' The state argued that failure to prevent Myers' death would

seriously threaten prison order and security."26 Myers' death might generate
an explosive reaction among other inmates. 1" 7 The state asserted that such a reaction would be much less likely if Myers were involuntarily treated in order
8

to keep him alive."2

While unrest among other inmates can be avoided if the prisoner's demands
are acceded to, this alternative triggers other security and order claims the state
asserted in Myers. The inability to compel treatment might encourage other
inmates to attempt similar coercion.1 29 Submitting to a prisoner's demands
purely because of the protest method might violate the prison official's legal
119. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974). The court also mentioned rehabilitation as being a major state interest.
120. 292 S.E.2d at 56. The court never mentioned the terms security and order in its
holding. In finding authority for its conclusion that a prisoner's rights are limited, however,
the court cited Supreme Court cases which have been decided on security and order bases.
Id. citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 438
U.S. 119 (1977).
121. 292 S.E.2d at 58. "West Virginia's interest in preserving life is superior to White's
personal privacy (severely modified by his incarceration) and freedom of expression right."
Id. (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 56. See also supra note 120.
128. 879 Mass. 255, 899 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
124. 292 S.E.2d at 57.
125. 879 Mass. at
, 399 N.E.2d at 454. These are the facts upon which the court
based its decision. By the time the case was heard, however, Myers had received a kidney transplant and had been transferred to a minimum security prison. Although the case was factually
moot, the court found the issues presented in the original situation were of public importance and capable of repetition. Id. at
, 399 N.E.2d at 452.
126. Id. at
, 99 N.E.2d at 457.
127. Id.
128. Id. at
399 N.E.2d at 459 app. A prison official's speculation of explosive reactions should include the possibility that the hunger striker might die during force-feeding.
See Zellick, supra note 55, at 157 (food introduced into lung is easily fatal); Inquest on HungerStriker, BRIT. MaD. J., July 6, 1941, at 53 (force-feeding possibly leads to death-causing
pneumonia).
In 1980 Israeli prison officials accidently killed two hunger-striking inmates during a forcefeeding procedure. Force-FeedingStirs a Clamor, NawswEaK, Aug. 4, 1980, at 32. These deaths
prompted days of violent Arab protests. Id.
129.

379 Mass. at _,

399 N.E.d at 45?,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/5

14

Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis
1983]

FORCE-FEEDING HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONERS

duties. 3"0 For example, moving a prisoner to a minimum security block solely
to avoid having him starve could place both the public and other prisoners in
jeopardy. Finally, such concessions to a hunger striker would reduce the prison
supervisor's effective authority. 131 In Myers, the prison official argued that the
power to compel treatment would increase his ability to avoid these evils associated with submitting to unreasonable demands. 3 2 The same argument could be
used by a prison official seeking the power to force-feed an inmate.
The state's interests in maintaining order and security, suicide prevention,
preservation of life and custodial care are judicially recognized as appropriate
bases to force-feed protesting inmates. The prisoner, however, may have equally
compelling interests that protect his right not to be force-fed. If the individual's
interests are constitutionally protected, the courts must more carefully examine
the weight of the state's interests.
THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF A
HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONER

Until ten to fifteen years ago it was difficult to tell whether prisoners had
any constitutional rights. 33 Before the 1950s, they probably did not. The
prevalent theory was that prisoners were merely slaves of the state. 34 After
the slave theory declined, courts still did not recognize prisoner's rights. 3s
Inmate petitions claiming constitutional infringements were routinely dismissed under the "hands off" doctrine,' 3 a euphemism for judicial reluctance to
become involved in the prison's internal operations. 137 Many lower courts began
130. Id. at
3399 N.E.2d at 459 app.
131. Id. This could result from any unfair preferential treatment of fasters as perceived by the prisoners who abide by the system. See also Zellick, supra note 55, at 173-75. The
author discusses three additional, but less tangible, state interests in force-feeding a prisoner.
The first such interest is freedom from moral blackmail. A prison official should be free from
the threat to his conscience posed by a prisoner in his custody starving to death. Second, the
state's interest in rehabilitating prisoners is hindered by the prisoner's death. Third, the
state has a duty to carry out the sentence imposed by the courts. If a person has been sentenced
to ten years in prison, this interest is adversely affected by allowing the prisoner to "escape"
through death. Id.
132. Id.

133. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 90.
134. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). See Robbins, The Cry of
Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIA. L. & CPSMINOLOGY 211, 211 (1980).
135. J. GoBFRT & N. COHEN, supra note 90, at 1.

136. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) ("Traditionally, federal courts
have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration.'); Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 507-08 (1963).
137. J. GoBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 90, at 1. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853

(9th Cir.) (review of prison matters "not within the province of the courts'), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 955 (1951); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir.) ("not the function of the
courts'), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951)
("courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the various institutions'). For a

discussion of several rationale justifying the hands-off doctrine, see Robbins, supra note 134,
at 212-13.
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to ignore the doctrine in the 1960s,138 and in 1974, the Supreme Court explicitly repudiated it. The Court held that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims...
when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee...."139 It is now well established that inmates are not stripped of

constitutional protections. 40 Prisoners, however, retain only those constitutional rights not inconsistent with their status or the penal system's legitimate
41

needs.1

The prisoners in the principal cases set forth two constitutional arguments
for prohibiting force-feedings. First, because the hunger strike was undertaken
to make a statement, 142 it should be protected under the United States Constitution's first amendment free speech safeguards.1 43 Second, the right of privacy
allows a person to refuse medical treatment even when the effect of such refusal is death. 44
Prisoners'Hunger Strikes as Constitutionally
Protected Expression
The first amendment's guarantee of free speech is afforded great constitutional protection. 145 The first amendment protections can encompass nonverbal
communicative conduct.1 46 Nevertheless, it is clear that outside the prison

138. See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (Ist Cir.) (cruel
and unusual punishment), cert. denied sub nom., Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419
U.S. 977 (1974); Pierce v. La Valee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (prisoners' freedom of religion);
Sewell v. Pegelou, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961) (prisoners' freedom of religion), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 421 (1973); Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207 (D.S.C. 1973) (denial
of due process rights by disciplinary board). For a discussion of the social and political influences affecting the decline of the hands-off doctrine, see J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note
90, at 2-3.
139. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
140. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
141. See id. at 545-46; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125
(1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 'U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
142. See Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 833, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1982) (to get attention
450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1982)
of prison officials); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, ._
(to draw attention to the starving children of the world); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292
S.E.2d 54, 55 (W. Va. 1982) (to protest prison conditions).
143. 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; 87 A.D.2d at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624; 292
S.E.2d at 58.
144. 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716; 87 A.D.2d at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624; 292
S.E.2d at 58.
145. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(free speech is a right that cannot be circumscribed so that it exists in principle but not in
fact); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (free speech is the indispensable condition
of near.v every other form of freedom); American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)
(free discussion must be jealously guarded). See generally Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self Government, reprinted in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOm (1960).
146. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(wearing armbands as a symbolic act); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (first
amendment protects silent sit-in in a public library).
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context all conduct conveying a message is not constitutionally protected.14 7
Within the prison context first amendment rights are replete with uncertainty.' 48 Few Supreme Court decisions have addressed prisoners' free
speech rights. 149 Further, the Court has yet to examine first amendment rights
of symbolic conduct in a prison situation.150 A general reading of first amendment cases suggests, however, that a hunger-striking prisoner could not successfully rely on the right to free speech to avoid force-feeding.' s '
The Supreme Court has attempted to delineate when communicative
conduct can be governmentally prohibited or regulated. For the nonprison
context, the Court has established that the government's regulation:must: first,
further an important or substantial governmental interest; second, be unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and third, be the least restrictive of alleged first amendment freedoms compared to other available means that meet
the state's interests. 52 If the government regulation fails the second element,

147. For example, one may hang a congressman in effigy to express dissatisfaction with
his performance as a legislator. A law preventing such action would be held unconstitutional.
See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAv. L. Rev. 844
(1970). The congressman, however, may not actually be hanged even though there is at least
as much communicative impact in the death-producing act.
148. See J. GoBaET &N. CotEN, supra note 90, at 100; Note, A Review of Prisoners'Rights
Under the First, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, 18 DuQ. L. Rev. 683, 685 (1980).
149. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding a publishers-only rule for
prisoners' receipt of hard cover books); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433
US. 119 (1977) (upholding regulation against bulk mailing); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (upholding prison practice of inspecting mail); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(upholding ban against face-to-face interviews). Other cases, although apparently dealing
with prisoner first amendment rights, were actually based on the rights of outsiders. See, e.g.,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 148, at 684-88.
150. None of the principal cases cited any such precedent. See generally Zant v. Prevatte,
248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623
(1982); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982). See also Commissioner of
Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
151. Of the three principal cases, only the Chapman court applied a first amendment
analysis. The Chapman court dismissed the first amendment claim summarily: "[Wje need
only remark that Chapman's status as a prisoner renders his First Amendment rights subject
to the reasonable limitations necessary for the maintenance of order and discipline in a penal
institution." 87 A.D.2d at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627. See also J. GOBeT & N. CotEN, supra
note 90, at 108. The authors reach four conclusions derived from Supreme Court decisions
in the free speech area: (1) prisoners do not forfeit all first amendment rights; (2) first
amendment rights can be restricted when necessary to serve the legitimate penal goals; (8)
legitimate penal goals include, but are not necessarily limited to, maintaining internal security
and order and promoting rehabilitation; (4) significant deference is to be given the judgment of prison officials who formulate the rules which effectuate the above goals. Id.
Another method of analysis focuse on whether the speech infringement occurs in a
public forum. See generally L. TamE, AMelwcaN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 688-93 (1978); Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. Rev. 233.
152. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The Court also listed another requirement, that the regulation be within the constitutional power of the government. Id. It is
omitted here because it is implicitly a part of the first requirement. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment

Analysis, 88 HAtv. L. REv. 1482, 1483 & n.10 (1975).
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it is deemed a regulation aimed at the communicative impact of conduct. 153
As such, it is further analyzed to determine if the affected expression is constitutionally protected.1 5 4 The government must show either a clear and present
danger posed by the expression 55 or a compelling justification for the regulation that burdens protected speech.-5 6 The Court used this three-pronged test
to determine whether censorship of prisoners' mail was constitutional. 15 7 It
would seem appropriate, therefore, to use the same test in evaluating a prisoner's
15 8
hunger strike as protected communicative conduct.
Using this analysis a successful first amendment claim of a hunger-striking
prisoner is unlikely. The speech/conduct test's first and third requirements are
153. See L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at 584-85; Ely, supra note 152, at 1484. See also Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974).
154. See Ely, supra note 152, at 1484 (discussing switching to a different track of analysis
should the criterion of the speech/conduct test not be met). Examples of speech not constitutionally protected include: obscenity, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE ExPRESSoN 495-503 (1970); and
knowingly false statements, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
155. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana. 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (demonstrator's disorderly conduct
conviction invalidated because his expression failed to pose a clear and present danger);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (Ku Klux Klan leader's conviction under criminal
syndicalism statute reversed because advocacy was not directed to incite imminent lawless
action nor likely to cause such action). See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present
Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REy. 41.
156. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at 602;
Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727,
747 (1980).
157. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974). Several prisoners challenged the
validity of California prison rules authorizing mail censorship between prisoners and outsiders.
Although the three requirements were combined into two, the wording was very similar:
[W]e hold that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met.
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. . . . Second, the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.
ld. at 413.
158. This conclusion might be questioned because the prison case applying this test,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), focused on the rights of the nonprisoners whose
mail was also being censored. Id. at 408. The speech/conduct test, however, is not dependent
on the strength or weaknesses of a person's free speech rights. Rather, it is merely a tool to
see if those rights are even implicated. For example, this test was used in Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), even though the first amendment guarantees
could be restricted in light of the special school environment. Id. at 507. This restriction on
free speech liberties of students is, although lesser in degree, phrased similarly to the restriction on prisoner first amendment rights. "[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the correctional system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
It has been stated that the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), removed
even the pretense of the least restrictive alternative analysis for evaluating prisoners' first
amendment rights. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, supra note 90, at 108. Nevertheless, the reasons for
adopting the speech/content test prevail. See generally Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due
Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. Ray. 1, 10-11
(1978).
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customarily satisfied by the state showing a rational interest, which is easily
done. 5 9 The second requirement is an intent test. Absent explicit intent to
suppress the communicative content, 10 courts have sometimes inferred such
intent from the circumstances. 161 The government action fails the second test
if the harm the state seeks to avert grows out of the actor's communication.162
Applying this test to an inmate hunger strike is facilitated by postulating
two analyses. First, if the state were to base the attempt to force-feed on its
suicide prevention and preservation of life interest, the first and third requirements of the speech/conduct test would be met. The state has valid reasons for
preventing suicides and preserving lifeo1s and there is no less drastic means
to protect these interests than by force-feeding.6 4 The critical issue is thus the
state's intent, and whether its action is aimed at the message conveyed by the
strike. Regardless of the inmate's message or lack of message in not eating, the
state's interest in suicide prevention and preservation of life are not contentbased. 6 The prisoner would have no viable first amendment claim.
A second analysis is demonstrated by hypothesizing there are two different
fasters in prison. Assume that one prisoner merely stops eating with no communicative intent. The second hunger striker uses his fast to receive concessions.
If the state let the first prisoner die but attempted to stop the second, the state's
evident motivation would be content-based, and the action would not pass the
166
test's second criterion.
Once state action has failed the speech/conduct test, 67 the state would have
159. See Ely, supra note 152, at 1486 (first requirement has turned out to be no protection
at all to those engaging in symbolic speech). Id. at 1485, 1506 (third requirement is easily met
especially when confronting unorthodox modes of expression). See, e.g., United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
160. This automatically triggers analysis of the expression's constitutional worth. See
supra note 154. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (statute singling out information about drug prices); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (statute singling out offensive conduct, applied to offensive
language).
161. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
LJ. 1205, 1338 (1970).
162. See Ely, supra note 152, at 1497. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), a school attempted to prohibit students from wearing armbands
to protest the United States' Viet Nam War involvement. Id. at 504. The state asserted a negative reaction to the armbands would cause a major disruption in school. Id. at 505. Because the
harm in this case, disruption of school, flowed directly from reaction to the armbands' communicative content, the school regulation failed the intent requirement. Id. at 509-11. See
generally Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21

U.C.LA. L. Rxv. 29 (1973).
163. See generally supra notes 33-92 and accompanying text. Despite any of the arguments propounded by this Note which tend to discredit these interests, they are sufficiently

based, even if only in constant repetition, to pass a minimal scrutiny test. See supra note 159.
164. But see Radzinowicz & Hood, The Status of Political Prisoner in England: The
Struggle for Recognition, 65 VA. L Rav. 1421 (1979) (describing the "Cat and Mouse Act").
165. See Nimmer, supra note 162, at 38-39.
166. The state would probably deny that it was force-feeding to inhibit speech. Under
the speech/conduct test, however, such an intent could be imputed to the state's actions.
167. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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to demonstrate that allowing the action to continue would present a clear and
imminent danger to substantial societal interests.0 8 This burden has traditionally been difficult to meet.16 9 The prison environment, however, triggers
a different test. The Supreme Court has held that prison officials may examine
the purpose for a prisoner's exercise of a constitutional right170 for detrimental
1
effect on prison order and security."
For example, assume a person outside prison writes a book explaining
methods for escaping from prison. To suppress publication of the book the
state would have to prove that the book's distribution would present a clear
and present danger to its interest in prison security. 7 2 The state need not prove3
that the book will imminently lead to inmate escapes to ban it inside a prison.Y
The state need only claim that the book's purpose is to help prisoners escape. 7 4
Similarly, the state can assert that the hunger striker's purpose is to manipulate
the prison system which causes a disruption of prison order. 7 5 The importance
of the state's interest in prison order would allow hunger strikes with an expressive purpose to be prohibited. Moreover, the courts will not disturb the
state's characterization of the prisoner's purpose absent substantial proof that
the state has exaggerated the threat to security. 7 6 Practically, this is an insurmountable burden.' 77 The hunger-striking prisoner, therefore, has no viable
s
first amendment claim."
The Prisoner'sPersonhood Rights
The second constitutional right asserted by the hunger strikers in the
principal cases was their right of privacy or personhood 7 9 Personhood en168. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
169. See L. TRIBE, supra note 151, at 602.
170. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 nA (1977).
399 N.E.2d
171. Id. See also Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, ._
452, 458 n.4 (1979) (the purpose of life-saving treatment refusal was to manipulate the
prison system).
172. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 237 (1963). See also United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (1979)
(needed to show irreparable harm to suppress publication and distribution of article describing how to make a hydrogen bomb).
173. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974) (prison official need not show
with certainty that correspondence will adversely affect security and order interests and
obviously can prevent escape plans from circulating).
174. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 nA (1977).
175. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
176. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
177. See Robbins, supra note 134, at 219 (The substantial deference given prison administrators by the Court has created a new hands off doctrine.). See generally Berger, supra
note 158, at 20.
178. From a practical view, a hunger striker may not have a valid first amendment claim
because his speech has not been impaired. Although he is being kept alive, his abstinence
from food has gained the attention of prison officials and possibly the public. By keeping
him alive, however, the impact of the speech has been lessened. There is no pressure on the
prison to choose between a prisoner demand and a life.
179. See supra note 144. The term "personhood" has been defined as "those attributes

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/5

20

Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis

1983]

FORCE-FEEDING HUNGER-STRIKING PRISONERS

compasses the right to be let alone,18 0 the right of bodily integrity, and the
right of self-determination. 18' These rights protect a hunger striker's behavior
in two ways. First, a competent person has the right to determine the course
any unauthorized
of his life, including how and when life shall end. 8 2 Second,
83
treatment is an invasion of his right of bodily integrity.
The Supreme Court has granted constitutional protection for personhood
rights;8 4 however, these rights are not absolute.8 5 As early as 1891 the Court
recognized: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraints or interference by others
unless by dear and unquestionable authority of law."' 8 6 The Court thus defined personhood rights with a balancing test. These rights have substance only
of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood." L. TRmE, supra note 151, at 889
(quoting Freund, 52d A.L.I. Annual Meeting 42-43 (1975)). This right has been based on
elements of Natural Law. Id. at 894-95. One often-quoted explanation of the source of personhood rights is the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 352-53 (1967)):
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his

feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They

conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone

-

the most compre-

hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,

every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See generally Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let
Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699.
180. See Craven, supra note 179, at 699.
181. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982) (right to personal security
is a substantively protected liberty); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104
(1960) ("Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination');
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 (1977) (privacy "is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and selfdetermination'); Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 603, 383 A.2d 143,
148 (1977) ("individuals must be given the maximum latitude in determining their own
destiny'); Byrn, supra note 41, at 9 (right of bodily self-determination); Note, supra note 92,
at 293-94 (there is a common law principle of "the inviolability of the body'). See generally
Cantor, supra note 45, at 236-38.
182. See generally Note, The Refusal of Life-Saving Medical Treatment vs. The State's
Interest in the Preservation of Life: A Clarificationof the Interests at Stake, 58 WASH. U.L.Q.
85, 96-100 (1980).
183. See generally id. at 100-01.
184. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception for
minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 153 (1973) (woman's freedom to choose whether to
terminate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (rights of married
couples). See generally Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 9
VmL.L. REV. 833 (1974); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. Rv.

219 (1965).
185. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US. 11, 26 (1905). The right to be let alone is
subject to the state's interest in safety, health, peace, good order and community morals. Id.
186. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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insofar as the personal freedom does not conflict with an overriding state
interest.187 Examining the balance between personhood claims and the state
interests will isolate unaddressed salient factors and define a hunger-striking
prisoner's personhood rights.
Personhood Rights vs. Suicide Prevention
In Chapman, the New York court found that personhood rights do not
embrace suicidal activities.18 New York, however, does not have a statute prohibiting attempted suicide.18 9 At least one federal appellate court has declared
refusing necessary medical aid is lawful in states without statutory prohibitions
of attempted suicide.1 90 The court noted, however, that states may compel lifesaving medical assistance if they have made attempted suicide illegal.19' Therefore, only statutory prohibitions would be sufficient authority to overcome a
personal choice of life or death. 192 Most other courts and commentators, however, disagree. 193
The criminality of attempted suicide may be irrelevant in the personhood
balance.194 The lack of a criminal statute does not generally evidence lessened
state concern,' 0 s but rather reflects legislative recognition that persons attempting suicide need professional help rather than punishment. 96 Further,
criminalizing attempted suicide has little, if any, deterrent effect. 97
The Chapman court relied on several statutes to find a compelling interest
in suicide prevention. 98 These statutes allow involuntary commitment of a
person likely to harm himself, 99 authorize a person to use the physical force
necessary to stop a suicide2oll and make aiding or promoting suicide a felony.29 '
Similar statutes or common law doctrines can be found in most other jurisdic-

187. See Riga, supra note 62, at 132. Individual rights do not exist in se et per se, but
only exist when society recognizes them in the face of coercive government force. Id.
188. 87 A.D.2d 66, ._
450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (1982). The court stated: "To characterize
a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to that Constitutional protection would be ludicrous." Id.
189. The Chapman court does not cite to such a statute although it cites other relevant
statutes. Id. at -, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (1953) (suicide unlawful although
not criminal). See also Byrn, supra note 41, at 18 ("the failure to outlaw attempted suicide
does not make it lawful").

194.

See generally Comment, supra note 56, at 468.

195. See State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 853, 251 N.W. 717, 719 (1933); Commonwealth
v. Wright, 26 Pa. 666, 669 (1902); Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
196. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 26 Pa. 666, 669 (1902); Schulman, Suicide and Suicide
Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54 A.B.A. J. 855, 860 (1968).
197. See Comment, supra note 56, at 470-71.
198. 87 A.D.2d at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26.

199. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, .39, A1 (Consol. 1978).
200. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 35.10 (Consol. 1978).
201. Id. §§ 125.15, 120.30.
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°
and should be sufficient authority of law to justify state intrusion upon
tions202
decision to commit suicide.20 3
person's
a

Personhood Rights vs. Preservation of Life
Personhood rights have been frequently balanced against the state's preservation of life interest in two nonprison circumstances: terminally ill patients refusing life-sustaining medical treatment 204 and Jehovah's Witnesses refusing
2°0
medically necessary blood transfusions. 20 5 In re Quinlan involved an in207
who was kept physically alive2°s through the
curably comatose patient
constant assistance of a respirator, catheter, feeding tube and full-time medical
supervision. 00 The Supreme Court of New Jersey suggested that the constitutional privacy right encompasses a patient's decision to decline medical treatment in certain circumstances.2 10 The court posited a formula for identifying
these circumstances. The state's interest in preserving life weakens and the
individual's personhood right grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.2 11 At some point the individual's rights overcome the
21 2
state's interests.
In interpreting the prognosis factor, the Quinlan court examined both the
extended length 213 and the quality of life. 21 .4 Karen Quinlan could have lived
indefinitely in her comatose state, but the court found the prognosis for a
meaningful existence dim.21 5 The dimness of prognosis factor requires a court
to evaluate the quality of life resulting from undesired treatment, which often
necessitates examining the nonphysical qualities of life. For example, one
court has stated that depriving a competent human being of the right to choose
217
210
his destiny lessens the value of life. A study of the Jehovah's Witness cases
lends insight into the weight of nonphysical qualities in assessing prognosis.
202. See Schulman, supranote 196, at 858-61; Comment, supra note 56, at 468.
203. This conclusion is based on the standard discussed supra text accompanying note
187, which indicates that personhood rights may be restricted by clear authority of law.
204. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J.
Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
205. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Melido, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
206. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).

207. See id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 654.
208. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655. Although her brain was capable of some primitive reflexlevel functioning, she had no cognitive function or awareness of her surroundings. She did
not, however, exhibit the signs of "brain death." Id., 355 A.2d at 654.
209. Id., 355 A.2d at 655.

210. Id. at 38-39, 355 A.2d at 663.
211. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663.
214. Id. "[N]o external compelling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the
unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
215. See id. at 26, 41, 355 A.2d at 664, 669.
216. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E2d
417 (1977). That court stated:
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Superficially, the Jehovah's Witness cases are contradictory on the weight
afforded personhood rights.2- s Further examination, however, reveals that
those cases finding a governmental power to compel transfusions have done so
in circumstances in which the state could invoke the parens patriae doctrine. 219
When the state used another basis for its preservation of life interest, the
courts have upheld the patient's ability to refuse transfusions. 220 The Jehovah's
Witness cases demonstrate the importance of considering life's nonphysical
qualities when evaluating prognosis. In most instances the patient can be restored to full health if compelled to take the transfusion.221 The courts, however, evaluate the spiritual quality of life and have refused to force a Jehovah's
22
Witness to live a life in sin when he has competently chosen death. 2
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the sanctity
of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life.
The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but
by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.
Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
217. In these cases a member of the Jehovah's Witness faith has contracted an illness
or had an accident whereby the usual medical procedure would require a blood transfusion.
The litigation arises when the patient refuses the blood transfusion on the basis of his religious
beliefs.
In these cases most courts focused on the patient's personhood rights despite the presence
of the religious freedom issue. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1972)
(Yeagley, J., concurring); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965);
Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962). But see Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. I1. 1972).
218. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (ordering
a transfusion), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (forced transfusion violation of civil rights); United States v. George, 239 F.
Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (transfusion ordered); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (refusal of transfusion allowed).
219. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) (competent adult may
refuse treatment), afJ'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (1978) (holding limited to facts of this case). See, e.g.,
In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (dependant minor child and
that patient in extremis precluding rational thought, caused the court to refuse permission
to let the patient die), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F.
Supp. (D. Conn. 1965) (father with four minor children given transfusion despite his protests); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (patient
in shock and disoriented given transfusion over her protests); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (court ordered transfusion for
pregnant Jehovah's Witness despite her protests), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Powell v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965) (court
ordered transfusions for mother of six children).
220. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (court found
patient's actions were within his right to be let alone since he had no children, was capable
of rational decisions, and was not a danger to society). Brooks is considered the trend in the
law. See Byrn, supra note 41, at 18-19.
221. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). The woman's
peptic ulcer was not fatal after blood was transfused. See also Byrn, supra note 41, at 10.
222. There must not be any minor or unknown children affected. See supra cases cited
notes 219-20. See also United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965) (court
placed weight on the patient's statement that his conscience could "be clear" as long as the
court ordered the transfusion).
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The hunger striker's prognosis should he be force-fed is much like that of
the Jehovah's Witness. Physical health can be fully restored,223 however, his
ideological life has been diminished. 22 4 The Zant court recognized this
diminution. "The State can incarcerate one who has violated the law and, in
certain circumstances, even take his life. But it has no right to destroy a person's
will by frustrating his attempt to die if necessary to make a point."222 Just as
Jehovah's Witnesses have been allowed to follow their religious precepts,
hunger strikers might be allowed to choose a cause worthy of their possible
death. Denying the right to choose encroaches upon an integral part of person22
hood. 0
Analogizing a hunger strike to Quinlan offers a further insight into the
application of the prognosis factor. In Quinlan, the undesired medical treatment only sustained the patient's life in its damaged state. 22 7 There was no cure
associated with the treatment. 228 Similarly, the motivations prompting the
hunger striker's life-endangering protests are not erased through a force-feeding. 229 The prognosis for the intellectual well-being of the hunger striker is as
dim after treatment as before. 23 0 _
At this stage in the personhood analysis, the Zant and White courts diverged. 281 The Zant court implicitly recognized that certain causes are worth
dying for, even one as self-serving as a prison transfer. 23 2 In contrast, the White
court mused that "protestations for causes ... are emotional commitments as
various and unpredictable as the winds." 233 The White court thus would not
impute any future idealogical suffering into the prognosis factor. The re223. Force-feeding, however, is not a risk-free operation. See supra note 128.
224. See generally Thomas v. Collins, 323 US. 516, 531 (1945) (first amendment equates
freedom of mind with freedom of conscience).
225. 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 716-17 (quoting the lower court).
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
227. 70 N.J. 10, 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
228. Id., 355 A.2d at 651.
229. For example, had the prisoner in Zant been force-fed, the fears which prompted his
transfer request would not have been dissipated.
230. This point has much more appeal when evaluating a more politically oriented
protest, such as the hunger strikes by the Irish Republican Army in British prisons. See
Dooley-Clarke, supra note 53, at 5. Nevertheless, part of the essence of personhood is the
ability to choose one's own cause no matter how irrational it might seem to others. See In re
President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).

231. Compare Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 834, 286 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1982) (quoting
lower court) ("no [state] right to destroy a person's will by frustrating his attempt to die if
necessary to make a point') with State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W. Va. 1982)
("Nothing could destroy a person's will more than death.") (emphasis added).
232. See 248 Ga. at 834, 286 S.E.2d at 717.
233. 292 S.E.2d at 58 & n.5 citing J. JONEs, FROm HERE TO ETERNrrY (1951). The court,
therefore, was giving little credence to the prisoner's professed ideological commitments. This
view of prisoners' commitments might be attributed to the state interest in preventing any
risk of error in the hunger striker's judgment. This risk of error interest has been stated as:
"Life is too precious ... to permit its termination when there is the slightest possibility that
the decision to die will prove erroneous or based on false premises." Delgado, supra note 71, at
483. It has been argued, however, that this state interest should not apply to a person who is
competent to make life choices. Id. at 483-87.
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fusal to consider ideological effects, however, could have been a reaction to the
facts presented. The prisoner in White had lost in excess of one hundred
pounds without suffering serious physical deterioration.2 3 After the case was
argued but before the decision was announced, the inmate had voluntarily quit
his fast and had begun working as the prison's chief cook. 23 5 The court's refusal to seriously address the protests for a cause is not surprising. Future
courts, with more compelling facts, might reasonably reach a different decision.
To apply the Quinlan balancing test's second factor, the degree of bodily
invasion, it is necessary to understand the medical procedures for force-feeding.
There are essentially two methods of introducing sufficient nutrients into a
fasting person's body to keep him alive. The first method is through an intravenous tube..2 3 6 Although a seemingly unobtrusive medical procedure, it cannot
be safely performed on a struggling patient. 237 Intravenous feedings, therefore,
can only be used on a patient who is too weak to resist or who has been
sedated.223 Neither of these alternatives is satisfactory. If the doctor waits until
the patient is overcome with weakness, the treatment can be continued only
until the patient regains his strength.2 3 9 Once he is strong enough to resist he
must be allowed to once again succumb to his fast before resuming treatment.2 4 0 Even if the prisoner is sedated, the intravenous feeding must be done
24 1
With
so slowly that almost constant restraint and sedation are necessary.
either method the hunger striker is being artificially kept in an unconscious
24 2
state. Doctors have found this neither medically nor morally sound.
Another method is to insert a feeding tube through the prisoner's nose or

234. 292 S.E.2d at 55. This would imply that the prisoner's build was such that the loss
of 100 pounds was not seriously harmful.
235. Id. at 55 n.1.
236. See Joyeux & Solassol, Basic Problems of Artificial Nutrition, 26 BioMEDIcINE 149
(1977). Intravenous feeding should take place under strict aseptic conditions. Id. at 152.
237. See Standing Firm, 124 NEw L.J. 513, 514 (1974).
238. See id.; Zellick, supra note 55, at 157. The intravenous process is slow. The prisoner
would not be able to be taken from his cell, sedated, and then returned. Rather, he would
be continually confined to the hospital. See Standing Firm, supra note 237, at 514.
239. Zellick, supra note 55, at 157.
240. Id.
241. Id. Standing Firm, supra note 237, at 514, suggests that a prison hunger striker
be told that after fasting one week he will be sedated and intravenously fed for a fixed
period.
242. See Zellick, supra note 55, at 157. In 1975 the 29th World Medical Assembly issued
the Declaration of Tokyo. Declaration 5 reads:
Where a prisoner refused nourishment and is considered by the doctor as capable of
forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences of such
a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed artificially. The decision
as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a judgment should be confirmed by at
least one other independent doctor. The consequences of the refusal of nourishment
shall be explained by the doctor to the prisoner.
Lewey, Force-Feeding-A Clinical or Administrative Decision?, 116 CAN. Ma. A.J. 416 (1977).
The present policy of the Canadian Medical Association is that a prisoner who refuses
nourishment shall be artificially fed. Id. The British policy is to leave discretion to the
prison's medical official. Id.
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mouth.24 3 This method is preferred by prison administration and is more
commonly used. 244 The prisoner can go about his daily routine except during
meal time. 245 This method requires some cooperation from the patientprisoner. When the patient resists, this method may cause pain and risk of
injury or even death. 246 Both methods of force-feeding involve significant
physical intrusion.
Most courts have considered more than the purely physical aspects of the
bodily invasion. 247 For example, a blood transfusion entails a relatively minimal
physical intrusion. 24 8 To a Jehovah's Witness, however, that simple medical
process involves great insult and degradation as his religious beliefs are openly
thwarted.2 49 Similarly, the Myers court found the trial judge had viewed the
obtrusiveness of hemodialysis too narrowly. 250 Although the procedure was
physically unobtrusive, it required considerable commitment from the patient
who had to undergo the treatment three times a week. 251 Force-feeding a hunger
striker parallels both these examples. Tube feeding involves great indignation 25 2 as the prisoner remains conscious and physically restrained throughout the procedure. 25 3 Like the patient in Myers, the hunger striker must submit
to the procedure repeatediy until his resolve is broken.
There is a distinction, however, between the intrusiveness of force-feeding
and the procedures described in Quinlan, the Jehovah's Witness cases, and
Myers. The latter circumstances requiring the intrusive procedures were un243. See Standing Firm, supra note 237, at 514.

244. In addition, the prisoner need not be constantly sedated. All accounts of pastforcefeedings of hunger strikers have reported that tube feeding was utilized. See generally
Zellick, supra note 55, at 157.
245. See Pankhurst, Forcibly Fed, McCLuRE's August 1913, at 87 (suffragette's personal
account of being force-fed in jail). Although this source is quite dated, the same general
medical procedures were being used in 1974. See generally Zellick, supra note 55, at 157-58.
246.

See Zellick, supra note 55, at 156-58; Altman, The Doctor's World Hunger Strike:

What Is Role of Physicians?, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 20, 1981, at C3, col. 1; supra note 128 and accompanying text.
247. See Note, supra note 182, at 111. See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 754, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (1977) (examining the disorienting
effect of treatment).
248. An intravenous blood transfusion should be considered a physically minimal intrusion when compared to other cases evaluating intrusiveness. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) (patient on respirator), aff1'd with opinion, 379 So. 2d 359
(1978); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 NE.2d 1232 (1978) (amputation of leg);
In re Quackenbush, 156 NJ. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (amputation of leg).
249. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972). The patient was questioned about
his feelings concerning receipt of a blood transfusion. The patient responded: "I wish to live,
but with no blood transfusion. Now, get that straight." Id. at 374. Ignoring such an adamant
request would certainly cause indignation.
250. 379 Mass. __, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
251. Id. This invasion was significantly so great that had Myers not been a prisoner he
would have been allowed to refuse treatment. Id. at __, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
252. See Pankhurst, supra note 245, at 90. After being force-fed Ms. Pankhurst wrote:
"But infinitely worse than any pain was the sense of degradation, the sense that the very
fight that one made against the repeated outrage was shattering one's nerves and breaking
down one's self control." Id.
253. See Zellick, supra note 55, at 156-57.
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controllable; 254 conversely, any forced-feeding and accompanying pain or
degradation results solely from the hunger striker's conscious choice.255 Courts
have cited this voluntariness factor when discussing the appropriateness of
bodily intrusion.25 6 There has been no precedent, however, determining the
weight afforded this argument.
The Myers decision provides an overall view of the personhood and state's
life preservation balance.2 57 Unlike the principal cases, the Myers court described the Quinlan balancing test and systematically applied it to the facts
presented. 25 8 Myers' prognosis was considered bright because continued treatment would provide a normal and healthy life. 25 9 The magnitude of the bodily

intrusion dialysis caused was sufficiently great, however, to allow the personhood rights to prevail over the state's life preservation interests. 260 The Myers
court's analysis differs from that proposed above for hunger-striking prisoners
in only two respects. First, the Myers court did not consider the nonphysical
quality of life in evaluating the prognosis. Second, under the Myers facts, the
court had no reason to address how self-inducement of the condition necessitating treatment should affect the evaluation of bodily invasion. The Myers decision and these two additional factors provide an adequate basis for future
personhood and life preservation balancing in hunger strikes.
Personhood Rights vs. Prison Security and Order
The Myers court also balanced personhood rights against the state's interest
in an orderly and secure prison.2 61 The court found that the balance favoring
personhood against life preservation shifted when the state also asserted prison
order and security interests.26 2 The White and Chapman courts similarly relied
on this state interest to allow force-feeding. 263 The state interest in prison order
thus heavily weighs the balance against personhood rights.2

64

More sig-

nificantly, the state need only to recite, as if mere liturgy, its interest in "order
254. This relates to the omission-commission distinction in applying the second inquiry
of the traditional suicide test. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
255. See Standing Firm, supra note 237, at 514.
256. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 914 (1958). See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957) (consent to blood
test to determine alcoholic content of suspected intoxicated driver's blood is deemed given by
statute. The statute declared that one who operates a motor vehicle on a state road consents
to the blood test if there is reasonable cause for his arrest.).
257. 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452.
258. Id. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 455-56. The court does not directly cite Quinlan. Its
decision is, however, based on Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), which adopted the Quinlan test.
259. 379 Mass. at _, 399 N.E.2d at 456.
260. Id. at
, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
, 399 N.E.2d at 457. The state interest in protecting the health of persons
261. Id. at
in state custody need not be separately balanced against personhood rights. That interest
is considered an adaptation of the suicide prevention interest and is implicitly included in the
suicide/personhood balance. See supra text following note 126.
, 399 N.E.2d at 457. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
262. 379 Mass. at
450 N.Y.S.2d at 627; White, 292 SXE.2d at 56.
263. See Chapman, 87 A.D.2d at _
264. Of the three principal cases and Myers, Zant is the only court allowing the prisoner
to refuse treatment, and it did not discuss prison security and order interests.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/5

28

Ansbacher: Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for Analysis

19831

FORCE-FEEDINGHUNGER-STRIKING PRISONERS

and security." 265 Indeed, this state interest carries such a strong presumption
of validity that it is likely to overcome prisoners' rights daims.266 As a result,
many commentators have declared the Supreme Court's repudiation of the
"hands off" doctrine illusory. 267 This was substantiated in Bell v. Wolfish.268
In Wolfish, the Court decided whether correction officials could conduct
body-cavity searches absent probable cause to believe that the inmate was concealing contraband. 2 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
circumstances surrounding the searches and found insufficient security reasons
for the practice. 270 Accordingly, the appellate court held that the gross personhood violation inherent in body-cavity searches outweighed any claimed security interest. 271 The Supreme Court, however, found the facts concerning the
search's efficacy irrelevant. 27 2 Instead, the court allowed body-cavity searches
273
because "a detention facility is . . . fraught with serious security dangers."
A prisoner could successfully pierce the security and order interest presumption
only by producing substantial evidence that the restriction was irrationalY.27
In practical terms, this presumption is insurmountable.2 7 5
The one-sided balancing test of Wolfish might be avoided by distinguishing
force-feeding from a body-cavity search. In Wolfish, the court noted the search
was merely visual.27 6 The relationship between the need for body searches and
prison security is evident. A similar relationship between fasting arid pris6n
order, however, requires proof of likely mass emulation or rioting.2 7 Finally,
the most dramatic difference is that force-feeding may determine whether
prisoners live or die.
Focusing on these differences, a court might determine that the extreme
judicial deference to prison officials' judgments is inappropriate in hungerstrike situations. The Supreme Court in Wolfish relied on the separation of
powers doctrine to support its judicial deference mandate.2 7 8 The executive, not
265. See Berger, supra note 158, at 20; Robbins, supra note 134, at 219. See also Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (The court has accorded "virtually
unlimited deference to detention officials' justifications for particular impositions.').
266. See J. GOBERT &N. COHEN, supra note 90, at 16; The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1, 108 (1979).
267. See Berger, supra note 158, at 20; Robbins, supra note 134, at 219.
268. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
269. Id. at 558.
270. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish,
441 US. 520 (1979).
271. Id.
272. Id. See 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the Court has overlooked the
facts). The lower courts and the dissent found that contraband had only been discovered
once in a strip search and therefore concluded such searches lack utility. The majority found
this evidence demonstrated the searches' significant deterrent effect. Id. at 558.
273. Id. at 559. See Robbins, supra note 134, at 219.
274. 441 U.S. at 540-44 & n.23.
275. Se& Berger, supra note 158, at 20; Robbins, supra note 134, at 219; The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term, supra note 266, at 108.
276. 441 U.S. at 558 n.39. Security personnel did not touch the prisoners in making the
searches. Id.
277. See supra notes 127-2$ and accompanying text.
278. 411 U.S. at 548,
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the judicial branch, has been charged with prison operations. 2 7 9 Prison administration, however, does not usually include the responsibility of making
life and death decisions. If the courts always defer to prison administrators'
judgment, the balance will invariably favor the state. Adherence to a strict
policy of judicial deference in a hunger-strike situation allows administrative
judgment to decide life or death questions which are peculiarly within the
judicial realm.280 Instead, it is incumbent on the courts to impartially consider
all the factors of force-feeding decisions rather than blithely following the
state's assertion of prison interests.
CONCLUSION:

A

28

'

FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS

The three principal decisions and their different analytical routes reveal
the law's uncertainty in force-feeding hunger-striking prisoners. The analysis
of the balance between individual's rights and the state's interests offers no
definitive answer. That discussion, however, does establish a methodological
framework for analyzing hunger-striking prisoner cases. This conclusion summarizes the separate points of the framework.
The initial task is to determine the mental competence of the hungerstriker. A lack of mental capacity allows the state to substitute its judgment for
that of the hunger-striker. A prisoner, however, is not incompetent by virtue of
his inmate status. He has the right to make fundamental life choices even
though they may be overriden by countervailing state interests.
The state has the power and custodial duty to prevent suicides. Suicidal
behavior is determined by examining all facts surrounding a hunger strike. A
hunger strike may be distinguished from suicide by adopting the subjective
test of the intent requirement for suicide. The better approach recognizes
suicide laws inapplicable to those hunger strikers not manifesting mental disorder. Although if the facts indicate the faster's death would abandon a dependent child, under the parens patriae doctrine the state may act to prevent
death.
If neither suicide prevention nor parens patriae is applicable, the state's
ability to force-feed depends on the balance of four interests: preservation of
life, prison order and security, and the rights of free speech and personhood. In
balancing these interests, a court must consider that the state's interest in
prison order is given great -weight in this balance.
The Supreme Court has recently delineated the following factors which
279.
280.

Id.
See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370

N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). The court stated: "[S]uch questions of life and death seem to us to
require the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal
on which the judicial branch of government was created." Id.
281. See generally Berger, supra note 158, at 21-23 (discussing the general propriety of
judicial deference). Another argument for distinguishing Wolfish is to assert that the constitutional right to die is a fundamental right that the state may burden only if a compelling state
interest is served. Assuming arguendo that the right to die is a fundamental right, the prison
official may look to the purpose of that right's exercise. Thus, the fundamental right to die
could be infringed just as first amendment rights can be, See supra text accompanying note
170.
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make the state's interest almost always determinative of whether to allow
force-feeding. Although convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional
protections, their rights may be limited or withdrawn to accommodate prison
order and security. 2s2 Prison administrators, not the courts, are to judge whether
there is an important security and order interest present. 28 3 In making this determination prison officials may look to the purpose for which the asserted
constitutional right is being exercised. 2 1 These administrative decisions must
be upheld absent substantial proof that the government's actions are an
exaggerated response to the perceived problem2ss
The right to free speech will be pertinent only in extremely limited circumstances. Even if this right is implicated, its effect in the prison setting is
tenuous.
The hunger striker's personhood rights are evaluated by considering the
degree of physical and ideological intrusion associated with a force-feeding.
The fact that any intrusion results from the striker's voluntary actions might
also be influential. The state interest in preserving life is enhanced by recognizthe that force-feeding can sustain the prisoner's physical health, but it is
weakened by recognizing the diminished quality of life after the forced-feeding.
RIcnARD
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282. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543, 545-56 (1979).
283. Id. at 547-48.
284. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 n.4 (1977).
285. 441 U.S. at 540 n.23. If an exaggerated administrative response can be proven, see,
e.g., Bono v. Saxhe, 620 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1980) (strip searches before and after) or the court
determines the prison interests are not implicated, then the other three interests must be
balanced. See, e.g., Zant, 248 Ga. at 833, 286 S.E.2d at 716 (it appears the state failed to assert
'its interest in maintaining prison order).
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